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Language and Thought: 
Some Dangerous Distinctions 
Kenneth Badley 
Ken Badley shows how influential the classifications we use are on how we think. With a series 
of examples he warns us against the unclear thinking and the faulty results that flow from 
inappropriate categorizations. 
Mr. Badley is a recent graduate of Regent College (Dip.C.S.'81) and is currently continuing 
studies at Regent in the Master of Christian Studies program. 
It has become popular of late to identify 
and criticize various sorts of jargon and mis-
use of language. This popularity is evidenced 
in newspapers and popular magazines. New 
York Times readers are regularly treated by 
William Safire. Time paid attention to ordi-
nary speech with an essay called "'80's Babble: 
Untidy Treasure" (January 28, 1980). Various 
Christian publications have taken notice of 
speech patterns as well. 
Such popularity is not necessarily a bad 
thing, for it is important that people attend to 
their linguistic habits and note their frequent 
reliance on "buzz-words", cliches, and mean-
ingless verbiage. In his essay "Politics and the 
English Language", George Orwell remarked 
that "the slovenliness of our language makes it 
easier for us to have foolish thoughts." His 
assertion touches on another aspect of how we 
use language, or perhaps in this case, of "how 
language uses us". I am referring here to the 
influence of speech habits on thought patterns. 
This is an aspect of language-use that, while 
more important than how jargon infiltrates our 
vocabularies or how we "misuse" language, 
has, up until now, received far less attention. 
If Orwell's comment is true and some of our 
foolish thoughts do find their root in our slov-
enly language then the connections between 
language and thought warrant examination. 
A centrally important area of connection 
between language and thought is that of 
classification (organization, categorization). 
We "classify" whenever we treat something or 
someone as part of a group or class of things 
or people, usually on the basis of some shared 
characteristic(s). It is by means of classifica-
tion that we make sense of an otherwise 
inchoate world of individual stones, books, 
fences, ideas, presidents, cars and trucks. To 
state the point another way, classification is 
necessary. 
Some students of language, in fact, go so 
far as to say that classification determines "in 
large measure" the way we react to that which 
is classified (Wendall Johnson, People in Quan-
daries, p. 261). B.L. Whorf asserts an even 
stronger hypothesis than that of Johnson. He 
claims that language 
ordains the forms and categories by 
which the personality not only com-
municates, but also analyzes nature, 
notices or neglects relationships and 
phenomena, channels his reasoning 
and builds the house of his conscious-
ness (Language, Thought and Reality, 
p. 252). 
Whorf's ideas were widely accepted initially, 
but have since been largely rejected for being 
too extreme. While there is this wide agree-
ment that Whorf was wrong in thinking that 
language determines thought to such great 
degree, few claim that he was wrong in the 
general direction of his thought. Language 
does determine the ways in which people think 
to some extent. 
In the classification process, language can 
exert its influence on thought at two points 
especially. First, the names or titles we give 
to our categories influence us and others posi-
tively or negatively about the individual things 
or persons we sort into those categories. This 
connects up with attaching labels and stereo-
typing, both of which are important, but 
neither of which can be our particular concern 
herein. The second sort of influence language 
has on thought within the broad area of classi-
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fication is our concern here: that is, that we 
are often led on by our use of familiar, indeed 
well-worn, verbal categorizations with the 
result that we make logical or mental classifi-
cations inappropriate or inadequate to take 
into account that which we are thinking about 
or classifying. Noting the possibility of faulty 
thinking does not constitute a call for the 
abolition of categorization or organized 
thought. Genesis chapter 2 records how God 
commanded Adam to distinguish between or 
classify - to name - the animals. Running 
throughout the Bible is an underlying distinc-
tion between obedience and disobedience. In 
his commentary on Second Corinthians, P.E. 
Hughes notes that "the ultimate and radical 
division of persons before God is that between 
believers and unbelievers, between those who 
are in Christ and those who are not" (p. 245). 
Classification per se, then, is not the main 
concern. But when the ways we classify 
hinder clear thinking or actively lead us into 
foolishness, then we must be concerned. We 
will now examine a few examples from every-
day speech that illustrate how we can be led 
astray in our thinking when we are not careful 
about our talking. 
One obvious example of an inadequate 
classification system is to be found when we 
consider the sorts of persons who identify 
themselves as Christians. No simple, two-
category division is adequate to account for 
the variety of sorts, yet the linguistic pair 
"conservative/liberal" frequently forces itself 
on the consciousness. If we accept the linguis-
tic polarity, it will dictate, in part, the sort of 
thinking we do about those varieties of people. 
It will be with great difficulty that we would 
be able to think clearly about the persons in 
question if we were to attempt to do so using 
the categories furnished by the polarity in 
question. The trio of words often used to 
identify churches - "evangelistic/social ac-
tion/renewal" is similarly inadequate to take 
into account the varied matter at hand. But, 
like "conservative/liberal", despite its in-
adequacy, it is deeply, even unnoticeably 
imbedded in our language and we often allow 
it to wrongly channel our thinking. 
Notice the distinction between "church" 
and "para-church". As we consider the word 
"church" we see there are a number of senses 
or meanings. "Church" is used to mean local 
assembly or congregation, denomination or 
body of Christ ..• plus a number of other 
things. But "para-church", if not considered 
carefully, can register on the consciousness 
and even work its way into the consciousness 
as in some way outside the Church universal, 
the last sense of "church" listed above. We 
may mean to distinguish such groups or organi-
zations from local congregations, but we 
possibly allow a seed of exclusivism to invade 
our thinking if we do not remember that 
"church" has many senses. When we do end up 
in faulty thinking such as this we should make 
an adjustment in our categories. But we often 
keep the faulty linguistic distinction because 
of its familiarity and make the adjustment in 
our understanding of the reality about us in-
stead. In this way we construct a faulty view 
of the world. Exactly what Orwell said would 
happen takes place and our foolishness hinders 
our efforts. 
One further polarity warrants detailed in-
spection, not only because it is dangerous, but 
because it uncovers a whole nest of logical and 
linguistic confusions surrounding a concept 
with which many Christians are properly (and 
some centrally) concerned: "integration". 
This polarity comes in various forms: we 
sometimes hear people say, "He missed heaven 
by eighteen inches, the distance from his head 
to his heart." Or we hear the commonplace, 
"Theological students' heads swell and their 
hearts shrink during their time of study." 
These two sayings, and others which, in some 
similar fashion, admit to a divorce between 
the intellectual and the spiritual, do not sur-
prise us. At least two things foster this lack 
of surprise, both having to do with familiarity: 
the distinction explicit in the phrases is a 
familiar part of our thinking and the meta-
phoric use of "heart" is so deeply imbedded in 
Western thought (and, one might note, Chris-
tian thought) that it is, to use a technical 
term, a "dead" metaphor, one of which few 
people any longer take note. When we speak 
of the heart as the "seat" of the emotions or 
the source of the feelings we can tend to 
forget that it is merely a muscle, albeit a vital 
one, for pumping blood through the arterial 
and veinal systems. When we forget we are 
using "heart" metaphorically when we put it to 
work in this fashion, it can become a danger-
ous and misleading metaphor. We become 
victims of our own picturesque language with 
the result that we come to view the emotion-
al, feeling, spiritual "part" of our lives as just 
that - a part of our lives. Furthermore, we 
come to view this "part" as separate from and 
opposed to rationality, thought and the intel-
lectual "part" of our lives which we view as 
"seated" in the head. In short, we become 
trapped. 
The fact that picturesqueness is identified 
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as part of the problem does not mean we 
should eradicate metaphor from our language. 
On the contrary, metaphor helps keep lan-
guage from becoming boring, among other 
things. The metaphor in question - that of the 
heart as the seat of the emotions - might even 
be argued to be useful in terms of verbal 
economy (using fewer words to convey an 
idea), besides its obvious contribution of pic-
turesqueness. But this "heart" metaphor, and 
the polarity of which, in this case, it is a part, 
refuses to relinquish its hold on our conscious-
ness. We are hard-pressed to find new ways to 
speak about how the spiritual and intellectual 
aspects of life are inter-related. Additionally, 
our attempts to think about what is a problem -
lagging spiritual fervor among theological 
students (another metaphor) - are hindered 
because the language and the logical 
categories made available by the language 
force us to conceive of the problem in only 
one, and in this case, inappropriate, way. We 
attempt to solve a problem according to how 
we conceive of the problem and if we conceive 
of it in the wrong way we will probably not 
succeed in solving it. 
Some who have recognized how "heart" and 
"head" can come to have these dangerous 
senses have attempted a move in the right 
direction by using the word "integration". We 
frequently hear that some book, magazine or 
college will help the Christian integrate his or 
her "faith and learning" or "faith and life". It 
is probably safe to suppose that the people 
using "integrate" in such phrases want to 
demonstrate the inter-relatedness of faith and 
learning or faith and life; they are trying to 
communicate that they have some notion of 
"all truth being God's truth", "taking every 
thought captive to the obedience of Christ", 
"thinking Christianly" (as H. Blamires discusses 
in The Christian Mind) or some similar idea. 
We would expect little protest that any school 
or publication should have such noble aims. 
Yet phrases employing "integration" in the 
above ways accomplish two things that run 
directly counter to the purposes I attributed to 
the sort of people who use the word. First, 
"integration" persists in implying the existence 
of some basic division between faith and what-
ever it is that is to be integrated with faith. 
We adopt a word to indicate that we want 
people to understand the nature of the rela-
tions between Christian faith and all we are 
and do, but the word we choose cons ti tut es an 
admission that the two are separate and refuse 
to go together easily. Thus we see that we 
have conceived of the problem wrongly: it is 
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not that we want to relate two things, but that 
they are naturally related and we want people 
to view them in that way. Yet "integration" 
carries the connotation that we wish to join 
these two separate and in some elusive way, 
incompatible entities. 
The second destructive accomplishment of 
"integration" is that it reduces the Christian 
faith to a level of logical equality with what 
ever it is it is being integrated with, whether 
that be "faith and learning", "faith and life", 
or, say, "Christianity and psychology". The 
question must be asked "How is the founda-
tional 'thing' which underlies, informs, 
undergirds, overarches, motivates all one is 
and does and wants to become and do, how 
does this 'thing' - Christianity - integrate with 
one's job, one's learning or one's life?" Since 
the Christian faith which, in some senses, 
(again, what words does one use?) constitutes 
the basis of the person's life, is of a different 
logical sort from anything else which may be a 
"part" of that person's life, perhaps "integra-
tion" should be qualified and used with caution 
if it must be used. 
The word "integration", then, not only ad-
mits to and continues to remind us of an old 
divorce we never wanted and are trying to 
forget, but renders "faith" the logical equiva-
lent of whatever "part" of life it is we are 
talking about integrating with faith; it treats 
faith as logically similar to a discipline of 
study, a hobby or a vocation. 
In light of the weaknesses of "integration" 
a replacement word or metaphor for it should 
be sought, one that has the strengths of "inte-
gration" but answers the two objections to 
"integration" I have raised herein. "Inter-
woven" (the tapestry metaphor) comes to mind 
as a possibility. It catches the sense of inter-
relatedness better than "integration" does. 
Yet it logically reduces Christianity in the 
same, or perhaps a worse way, than "integra-
tion" does. Both criticisms must be answered 
for a replacement to be satisfactory. 
Two further concluding remarks are in 
order. First, for all its drawbacks, at the 
present time "integration" seems to be the 
best word available to catch all that we mean 
when we talk about "integration". We thus 
may have no choice but to continue to use it, 
but we should always keep aware of how it 
imports other, destructive notions along with 
the notions we might intend at any particular 
time. Having begun to win the battle by recog-
nizing some weaknesses of the "heart/head" 
polarity, let us not lose it by careless overuse 
or even careless use of "integration". 
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Second, and finally, since the best method 
of teaching the meanings of words is demon-
strating how they are used in actual language, 
let us demonstrate what "integration" means 
by our own lives. The Bible says we are "new 
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Solzhenitsyn: The Moral Vision, by Edward 
E. Ericson, Jr. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980, 
239 pp., $12.95. 
In the introduction to this book, Ericson 
makes clear something that not all of Solzhen-
itsyn's public know. Although Solzhenitsyn 
made public his commitment to Christianity 
only in the early l 970's, his faith had been 
hammered out on the anvil of the Archipelago 
years of the l 940's, when he moved from Marx 
to Christ. The consistent moral vision that 
Ericson claims for Solzhenitsyn, he insists, is 
based on his Christian faith and permeates all 
of his writing, even the earliest. Believing 
that the Russian novelist has been largely 
misunderstood and misinterpreted, Ericson 
sets out to explain his moral vision to two 
kinds of readers: the general reader (non-
Chr istian and Christian) and specialists in the 
Slavic language and literature who, he believes, 
will bear "the major burden of mediating 
Solzhenitsyn to future generations of readers." 
Misinterpretation of Solzhenitsyn arises 
mainly from the media, and although this fact 
is recognized by many thinking people, Ericson 
is to be congratulated on his courage in saying 
it out loud. Ericson points out how commenta-
tors and news writers fasten on Solzhenitsyn's 
non-literary speeches and letters, for example, 
"A World Split Apart" (the Harvard Address), 
and slip out illustrative references to the 
Vietnam war, pornography, television pro-
gramming, etc., which comprise only fugitive 
passages, and blow them up to seem the bur-
den of his message. This intellectual dishonesty 
he shows also in the media's strident and huffy 
reaction to Solzhenitsyn's exposure of the 
materialism and decadence of the West while, 
at the same time, it underplays the Russian 
writer's careful analysis of the underlying 
cause (largely secular humanism) of the decay. 
creatures" if we are in Christ. Let us let our 
new creature-liness show how the spiritual is 
not a "part" of life at all; let us be integrated 
in that sense of the word. D 
To all the negative furor in the Western press 
to the published Letter to the Soviet Leaders, 
which decried Solzhenitsyn's nationalism, iso-
lationism, authoritarianism and rejection of 
scientific technology, Ericson makes a single, 
devastating reply: "The first thing to under-
stand about it is that it was intended to be 
practical advice to those aging men who actu-
ally held power in the Soviet Union. They are 
the audience, not Western intellectuals." 
Ericson's book covers a wide spectrum of 
Solzhenitsyn's writings. However, the claim of 
Malcolm Muggeridge in the "foreword" that 
the author "takes the reader systematically 
through all Solzhenitsyn's works", cannot be 
substantiated. Ericson himself tells of his 
regret that The Oak and the Calf was not 
published at the time he wrote his book, and 
therefore he could not deal with it. Solzhenit-
syn's Letter to the Third Council of the 
Russian Church Abroad is not mentioned, nor 
is his letter to the Secretariat of the Soviet 
Writer's Union upon learning of his dismissal 
from the Union on November 12, 1969 ("Blow 
the dust off the clock. Your watches are 
behind the times. Throw open the heavy 
curtains which are so dear to you. You do not 
even suspect that the day has already dawned 
outside."). 
Significantly, the first work Ericson ana-
lyzes is the Nobel Lecture in Literature (1970). 
He rightly holds that only a thoughtful reading 
of this address will give the reader the clue to 
all of Solzhenitsyn's writings, for his theory of 
art defined in the address is indeed the only 
context within which all his works can be 
understood. Like Dorothy Sayers (The Mind of 
the Maker), Solzhenitsyn is convinced that art 
is a gift from God, and involves the exercising 
of the artist's God-given creative ability as "a 
common apprentice under God's heaven". As 
the artist recognizes these facts, he then real-
izes his indisputable responsibility to society. 
